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 Fundamentalism is a four-letter word in some quarters. It is associated with literalism, 
anti-intellectualism, and right-wing political agendas. Kathleen Boone’s book is a fair treatment 
of a complex phenomenon. She does not shrink from criticism; on the other hand, she does not 
pillory fundamentalism. She is to be commended for ignoring the scandals and foibles of 
television evangelists. As she says, on Sunday mornings, “rank-and-file fundamentalists [are] in 
church listening to their own preachers, not home watching TV” (p. 113). Boone uses the 
insights of Stanley Fish and Michel Foucault to “analyze the role, both perceived and actual, that 
the Bible plays in constituting the authority of fundamentalism” (p. 1). Her analysis is 
convincing. However, one comes away wondering if her approach threatens the very foundations 
of a meaningful critique of interpretive communities.  
 
 The title of the book indicates that Boone confines her attention to Protestant Christianity. 
She proposes to treat fundamentalism as a “tendency, a habit of mind” (p. 10). The habit of mind 
to which she refers is the tendency to treat acceptance of the inerrancy of the Bible as the sine 
qua non of authentic Christianity. Boone points out that the creeds of fundamentalist 
organizations almost invariably mention belief in the inerrancy of the Bible before mentioning 
belief in God (p. 29). One need only examine J. Gordan Melton’s three volume American 
Religious Creeds (Triumph Books, 1991) to confirm Boone’s observation. Indeed, this is a 
measure of the extent to which fundamentalism diverges from historic Christianity: the great 
creeds of Christendom—the Apostle’s the Nicene, the Chalcedonian, and the Athanasian—never 
mention the Bible, much less an inerrant Bible. In a footnote Boone says that “any creed which 
mentions the Bible before it mentions God is, by definition, fundamentalist” (p. 117); however, 
this is contradicted by her acknowledgement that The Way International and the Worldwide 
Church of God, whose creeds mention the Bible before God, are not fundamentalist (p. 65). To 
make her case, Boone need only say that belief in the inerrancy of the Bible is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition of being a fundamentalist.  
 
  The doctrine of inerrancy is the view that the Bible, as originally given or inspired by 
God, was free from error, including what it says about theology, history, and science. Inerrantists 
deny that any translation of the Bible is inerrant; only the autographs, the original manuscripts, 
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were inerrant. Stated in this way, the doctrine of inerrancy is inconsistent with some of the things 
that we know about the Bible. Boone points out that Jesus spoke Aramaic but his words were 
recorded in Greek (p. 35); [22] hence, the bulk of the Gospel autographs were translations, and 
by the logic of inerrancy, not inerrant! The same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the many 
quotations from the Hebrew Scriptures in the New Testament. 
 
 Fundamentalists must take the reasoning a step further and say that New Testament 
translations of the Old Testament prophecies are more authoritative than the autographs they 
translate. For instance, Isaiah 7:14 tells of “a young woman” (Hebrew, ‘almah) being with child. 
Matthew 1:23, citing the Septuagint, renders this as “virgin” (Greek parthenos); the Hebrew 
word for virgin is betulah. Fundamentalists claim that Isaiah’s Hebrew is ambiguous and can 
mean either “young woman” or “virgin,” although their favored translation, the New 
International Version, does not translate other occurrences of ‘almah as “virgin” (see Genesis 
24:43, Exodus 2:8, and Psalm 68:25). Of course, the virgin birth is a doctrine dear to the hearts 
of fundamentalists. But this only serves to confirm the suspicion that the interpretive tail is 
wagging the textual dog, to use Boone’s colorful phrase (p. 64). In so many words, the 
fundamentalist is saying that Isaiah is not as clear as he could have been, and this oversight is 
corrected by a translation.  
 
 Within fundamentalist circles the doctrine of inerrancy seems to function as a statement 
of faith and not as a hypothesis that is subject to testing by impartial observers. It is quite 
impossible to test whether the autographs were without error since they no longer exist. At the 
same time, fundamentalists often claim that the original texts of the Bible have been reliably 
transmitted and reconstructed and hence, “for all practical purposes the original text is now 
settled” (Boone quoting Reuben A. Torrey, p. 30). By playing these claims off against one 
another fundamentalists can dismiss contradictions (did David kill Goliath [I Samuel 17:4-7, 
50]?; was it Elhanan [II Samuel 21:19-20]?; did Elhanan also kill Goliath’s brother [I Chronicles 
20:5]?), false statements (contrary to Leviticus 11:5-6, hare are not ruminants), and 
misquotations (Matthew 3:3 effectively changes the punctuation and hence the meaning of Isaiah 
40:3) and still refer to the Bible as “the inerrant Word of God.” 
 
 In the final analysis, it is the authority of the Bible that the doctrine of inerrancy is meant 
to safeguard. Fundamentalists believe that the Bible must be inerrant or nothing it says can be 
trusted (p. 13). Besides security against doubt, belief in an inerrant text can lead one to suppose 
that in quoting the Bible one is quoting God. However, as Boone notes, “[the] sole authority of 
the text is subverted by the very nature of texts” (p. 73). Texts require interpreters, and 
interpreters do not always agree. Boone neatly illustrates these facts by comparing the diverse 
views of three inerrantists on a passage in the book of Revelation (pp. 41-44). Boone also 
discusses the dispensationalism of the Scofield reference Bibles and the attendant doctrine of 
premillennialism [23] (p. 52f). The elaborate cosmic chronology of dispensationalism represents 
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one interpretation of the Bible but not, by any reasonable assessment, the only legitimate 
interpretation. As Boone notes, dispensationalism has been criticized for giving primacy to the 
teachings of Paul over the teachings of Jesus. We are brought again to the realization that even 
an inerrant text require an interpreter. Fundamentalists wisely stop short of claiming inerrancy 
for any interpreter; but if this is true, what is to be made of the claim that the text itself is 
authoritative? 
 
 Boone answers that there is an “interpretive [fundamentalist] community” that establishes 
hermeneutical norms and even “writes” the text itself (p. 61). Extra-textual authorities such as 
commentators, preachers, teachers, and administrators define and expound upon the “plain 
meaning” of the Scriptures and the average fundamentalist defers to these authorities. The 
frequent use of “Bible” as an adjective as well as the use of jargon, clichés, and shibboleths adds 
to the sense that the only intermediary between oneself and the Scriptures is the Holy Spirit. 
Boone is careful to note that no individual controls how the Bible is to be understood. Precisely 
because meaning is the product of an “interpretive community” authorities themselves must 
remain faithful to accepted norms of behavior and belief—the scandals of the TV evangelists 
prove this (p. 110). 
 
          According to Boone there is no better example of the fundamentalist’s adherence to “what 
the Bible says” than their belief in hell. While some fundamentalists embrace the belief in a 
literal hell (p. 47), others are clearly uncomfortable with it. Boone quotes a student at an 
evangelical college who regrets that the Bible requires one to believe that Gandhi is in hell. 
Others see the doctrine of hell as a liability that makes one’s apologetic task that much more 
difficult (p. 104). For this reason, some evangelicals deny that hell is everlasting or, noting 
discrepancies between expressions such as “everlasting fire” (e.g. Matthew 18:8; 25:41) and 
“outer darkness” (e.g. Matthew 8:12; 22:13), allow that the descriptions of hell may be 
metaphorical (p. 105). In any event, fundamentalists believe in hell, not because of the intrinsic 
merits of the doctrine, but because they believe it is a basic teaching of the Bible. 
 
 Boone ends her book with a challenge that fundamentalist leaders acknowledge their role 
in constituting authority (p. 111). In plainer language she is asking fundamentalists to own the 
fact that it is not the Bible that “tells them so” but their interpretation of the Bible that “tells them 
so.” This is a legitimate demand. On the other hand, Boone cannot dodge the question whether 
the meaning of the biblical text (or any text) is completely indeterminate. She clearly believes 
that there is a basis from which one can not only describe but also question fundamentalist 
discourse (p. 22). She sides with Edward Said who is critical of Fish [24] and Foucault for not 
providing a basis for questioning interpretive communities (p. 110). How this is possible apart 
from at least a minimally determinate meaning of the text is unclear.  
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 I question whether Boone can have it both ways: on the one hand to describe 
fundamentalist discourse using theories that deny determinate meaning to the text while, on the 
other hand, maintaining that this discourse can be questioned. The only hope she offers for being 
able to transcend our interpretations enough to criticize them is “our elusive common sense” that 
we are neither completely free nor completely determined (p. 110). This will come as little 
consolation to those who take seriously her observation, made earlier in the book, echoing 
Claude Buffier (in his Treatise on Metaphysics, 6th Conversation), that common sense is not so 
“common” after all (p. 40). 
 
 
 
